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On May 13, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”) announced its judgment in Google Spain SL, Google
Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario Consteja
González. The decision required Google to delist certain internet
search results when a search query was made using an
individual’s name. Commentators worldwide have referred to this
delisting as the Right to be Forgotten. This article analyzes the
legal background of the case, and the implications for technology
companies and individuals. Specifically, the article concludes the
required delisting is much more about obscurity than forgetting.
The article concludes by making a recommendation for how to
create an obscurity center, which could implement the delisting
requests.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
On May 13, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”) announced its judgment in Google Spain SL, Google
Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario Consteja
González (“Google Spain”).1 The decision handed down by the
CJEU,2 has generated considerable controversy in the European
Union (“EU”) and internationally.3
The increasingly connected and personal nature of technology
highlights the importance of this case. Individuals not only carry
personal technology, such as smart phones,4 but many devices in
the home connect directly to the internet, including cameras,
microphones, and motion sensors. These devices give service
providers an increasingly accurate and detailed view of an
individual’s activities and location and a more comprehensive
picture of what happens in the home. Any of this information could
be posted to the Internet (1) if a service provider buries the right to
do so in lengthy terms and conditions, (2) as a result of a data
breach, or (3) by an unscrupulous employee of the service
1

Press Release No 70/14, Court of Justice of European Union, Judgment in
Case C-131/12 Google Spain, SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de
Proteccion de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonzalez (May 13, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu.
2
Because the CJEU is located in Luxembourg, it is often referred to in
academic papers as the Luxembourg CJEU, not to be confused with the
European CJEU of Human Rights (ECHR), which is located in Strasbourg,
France.
3
See, e.g., Amber Melville-Brown & Caroline Thompson, Who-ogle?
Rehabilitation in the Digital Age, THE TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article4244517.ece; Robert Peston, Why Has
Google Cast Me Into Oblivion, BBC NEWS (Jul. 2, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28130581. Jeffrey Rosen called the concept
a major threat to free expression, even before Google Spain. See Jeffrey Rosen,
The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 90–92 (2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten.
4
Today, 68% of U.S. adults have a smartphone, up from 35% in 2011, and
tablet computer ownership has edged up to 45% among adults. Smartphone
ownership is nearing saturation with some groups: 86% between the ages of 18
and 29 have a smartphone, as do 83% of those between the ages of 30 and 49,
and 87% of those living in households earning $75,000 and up annually. Monica
Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/.
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provider. How the CJEU opinion is interpreted and implemented in
the time directly following the CJEU decision will have a lasting
impact on the ability of individuals to rectify situations where this
data is posted to the Internet.
Many commentators interpreted the CJEU’s opinion as a call
for a new “Right to Be Forgotten.”5 Legal and policy experts who
study Internet privacy reacted to the decision as if the CJEU had
demanded the burning of a library of books containing the
collective history of mankind. One legal commentator referred to
the CJEU judges as “clinically insane;”6 another referred to them
as “European luddites.” 7 This paper analyzes the decision and
disagrees with this assessment based on the authors’ understanding
of European law and the language of the opinion.
This paper first provides an overview of the case and the legal
foundations of the decision. It analyzes the ruling in the context of
the 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
(“Directive”). 8 Finally, this paper explains why the authors
disagree with many criticisms of the ruling.
Based on our analysis, we reach the following conclusions:
(1) The opinion is a straightforward application of existing
European law, substantially limited to the facts of the case. The
CJEU’s rulings do not reflect a desire on the part of the judges for
new legislation or policy.
5

See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to Forget, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-forcegoogle-to-forget.html.
6
Steptoe Cyberlaw Podcast – Interview with David Hoffman, STEPTOE
CYBERBLOG (Sept. 3, 2014), at 00:34:39, http://www.steptoe.com/staticfiles/
SteptoeCyberlawPodcast-032.mp3.
7
Michael Wolff, Wolff: The Right to be Forgotten by Google, USA TODAY
(May 18, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/wolff/2014/
05/18/a-big-setback-for-google-in-europe/9172941/.
8
Council Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L
281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
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(2) The opinion’s impact on free expression is substantially
mitigated as it explicitly permits the publishing of the information
at issue in the case. Moreover, providing the opportunity for
limited obscurity actually encourages free expression.
(3) The opinion does not result in the actual “forgetting of any
information,” as the information at issue can still be found using
different search terms.
(4) The opinion will present challenges and pose questions for
search engines and data brokers that must comply with the CJEU’s
findings. More guidance is necessary to help companies efficiently
and consistently arrive at appropriate decisions regarding delisting
certain answers from Internet searches.
Key to our analysis of the case is the idea that the legal rights
involved are not about “forgetting” but instead involve
“obscurity.” This paper distinguishes these terms and demonstrates
that the legal basis for the ruling in Google Spain is the Directive’s
language providing for the limited ability for erasure.9 In the case
of Google Spain, application of this provision would involve not
deleting or removing the newspaper article in question, but rather
making it necessary to enter more refined search terms than simply
a person’s name to discover the article. This limited erasure right is
quite different from concepts of “forgetting,” which would require
going back to source documents on the internet and making certain
that references to the primary material were removed entirely or
rendered not obtainable. Thus, rather than “forgetting,” the
application of the Directive’s erasure provisions to search engine
results provides for “the right to obscurity.”
The paper, then analyzes the case in light of developments in
the law since 2014, looking to case law from the European Court
of Human Rights (“ECHR”) to provide context for the CJEU
decision.10 Finally, the paper focuses on future developments and
approaches to the issue within Europe and in other jurisdictions.11
9

Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc.
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 100 (June 25, 2013).
10
See infra Part IV.E.
11
See infra Part V.
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Although the ruling is a predictable interpretation of the language
of the Directive, practical questions and concerns remain. The
CJEU decision unfairly burdens Google and other search engine
companies with determining when a request for obscurity should
be granted. The paper proposes that this burden could be removed
and calls for implementation of a global solution the authors refer
to as the “Internet Obscurity Center.”12
II.
FACTS & PROCEDURE OF GOOGLE SPAIN
In January 1998 and March 1998, the La Vanguardia
newspaper published information about a real estate auction held
to recover Mr. Costeja González’s social security debts.13 In 2010,
Mr. Costeja González, a Spanish citizen, filed a complaint with the
Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (“AEPD”)14 against La
Vanguardia. He alleged that when an Internet user entered his
name in Google’s search engine the user would be provided with
links to the 1998 La Vanguardia newspaper entries announcing a
foreclosure auction on Mr. Gonzalez’s home 15 Mr. Costeja
González asked that La Vanguardia be required to remove the
references to his name from the Internet postings of the original
newspaper pages, and that Google and its Spanish subsidiary
remove links to those pages from the results of searches of his
name.16 The AEPD rejected the demand that La Vanguardia delete
the references in the pages of La Vanguardia newspaper posted
online, but granted the request that Google adjust the search results
12

See infra Part VI.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶
14 (May 13, 2014).
14
The AEPD is the Spanish data protection authority. It is the national
independent public authority responsible for ensuring compliance with data
protection law. The Data Protection Agency interprets, applies and disseminates
data protection law, maintains the General Data Protection Registry, safeguards
citizens’ data protection rights, and authorizes international data transfers. Data
Protection in Spain: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://uk.practicallaw.com/1-520-8264#a246427; see Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos, www.agpd.es (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
15
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 14.
16
Id. at ¶ 15.
13
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so they would not return links to those pages in response to a query
of Mr. Costeja González’s name. 17 Google appealed to the
Audience Nacional, which in turn referred three questions about
European law to the CJEU. 18 The three questions relate to
jurisdiction, the role of the data processor, and data removal.19 The
CJEU’s response to these questions prompted a global discussion
about a so-called “Right to be Forgotten.”20
III.
THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF GOOGLE SPAIN
The CJEU decided Google Spain based on the Directive and
the relevant provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.21
Analysis of the decision requires an understanding of these two
documents.
Data protection in the European Union is primarily governed
by the Directive.22 The Directive was enacted based on Article
114(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”). 23 Article 114(1) states generally that the European
17

Id. at ¶¶ 16–17.
Id. at ¶¶ 17–20.
19
See infra Part IV.
20
See, e.g., Debate: Should The U.S. Adopt The ‘Right To Be Forgotten’
Online?, NPR (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/18/393643901/
debate-should-the-u-s-adopt-the-right-to-be-forgotten-online; Julia Powles &
Enrique Chaparro, How Google Determined Our Right to be Forgotten, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 18 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/
18/the-right-be-forgotten-google-search.
21
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights contains rights and freedoms
under six titles: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, and
Justice. The charter became legally binding in 2009 with the treaty of Lisbon.
See EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm [hereinafter
European Charter].
22
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Handbook on
European Data Protection Law 17 (2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-ed_en.pdf.
23
ORLA LYNSKEY, From Market-Making Tool to Fundamental Right: The
Role of the CJEU of Justice in Data Protection’s Identity Crisis, in EUROPEAN
DATA PROTECTION: COMING OF AGE 59, 60 (Serge Gutwirth et. al. eds., 2013);
see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 114, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]
(explaining the authority for the adoption of the Directive).
18
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Council and the Parliament may enact laws and measures to ensure
the proper functioning of the internal market.24
As required by law, the CJEU interpreted the facts of the case
and the Directive in light of the applicable provisions in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights (“European Charter”). 25 The
Charter, adopted in 2000, has been “a legally binding instrument of
EU law since late 2009, binding both the EU institutions and the
Member States . . . .”26 The Charter is referenced in Article 6 of the
Lisbon Treaty. 27 The Lisbon Treaty modified two pre-existing
treaties governing the mechanisms for operating the European
Union. 28 When it came into force on December 1, 2009, it
established the Charter as legally binding. The extent to which
provisions of the Charter can be directly enforced by Member
States of the CJEU is not clear. However, Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter—which articulate the rights to Respect of Privacy and
Family Life and Protection of Personal Data—are foundational to
understanding privacy and data protection rights in the European
Union.29 The key provision in the Charter applied by the CJEU in
Google Spain is Article 8, which makes clear that data that relates
to an individual must be processed fairly.30
24

TFEU, supra note 23.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 1
(May 13, 2014) (“This request for a preliminary ruling concerns . . . Article 8 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”); see also European
Charter, supra note 21.
26
Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court
of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. &
COMP. L. 168, 169 (2013).
27
Art. 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”), as amended by the
Treaty of Lisbon, states that the Union recognizes “the rights, freedoms and
principles set out in the Charter . . . which shall have the same legal value as the
Treaties.” See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(1),
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13, 19.
28
Id.
29
PAUL DE HERT & SERGE GUTWIRTH, Data Protection in the Case Law of
Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Constitutionalism in Action, 18 REINVENTING
DATA PROTECTION? 3, 7 (Serge Gutwirth et. al. eds., 2009).
30
European Charter, supra note 21, at 10. The relevant articles state:
Article 7 Respect for private and family life
25
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It is also important to understand the distinction between the
Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights (“the
Convention”). 31 The Convention was adopted in 1953 by the
Council of Europe.32 While all of the members of the European
Union are also members of the Council of Europe, the two
institutions and their roles are separate and distinct.33 The Council
of Europe created the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”)
to interpret the Convention.34 When the EU began its process to
create the Charter, the provisions of the Convention served as its
starting point.35 The language of the two documents is similar and
their provisions overlap in some areas. 36 As a consequence,
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life,
home and communications.
Article 8 Protection of personal data
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning
him or her;
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it
rectified;
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.
Id.

31

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
32
See Aisa Gani, What is the European Convention on Human Rights?, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/oct/03/whatis-european-convention-on-human-rights-echr (describing the history of the
convention and the main principles).
33
See European Convention, supra note 31.
34
See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 22
at 14.
35
Compare European Convention, supra note 31 (“Considering that this
Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and
observance of the Rights therein declared”), with European Charter, supra note
21 (“[I]t is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the
light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological
developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter.”).
36
See, e.g., European Charter, supra note 21 at art. 52(3) (“[S]o far as this
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning
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procedurally “judges first consider the Charter and then adopt
other human rights sources . . . .”37 The jurisprudence of the ECHR
is used as a tool of interpretation for CJEU decisions:
[t]he Court may adopt, with respect to provisions of the Convention, an
interpretation which does not coincide exactly with that given by the
Strasbourg authorities, in particular the European Court of Human
Rights. It is not bound, in so far as it does not have systematically to
take into account, as regards fundamental rights under Community law,
the interpretation of the Convention given by the Strasbourg
authorities.38

Article 52 of the Charter prohibits the CJEU from interpreting
the law in a way that would contravene the protection of the human
rights of a European citizen. 39 In this way, the architects of
European law have assured that even if the CJEU does not follow
the exact analysis as the ECHR on a similar issue, it must still look
to the ECHR case law for guidance. Two prominent Advocates
General add that:
[t]he Convention can be used as a second fundamental source in
identifying shared legal positions and the scope of their application.
Since its ratification, the [CJEU] increasingly refers to the Convention
to determine the basis and scope of fundamental rights. Furthermore,
the [CJEU] has explicitly recognized that EU [CJEUs] have to take the
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg into
account in interpreting fundamental rights.40
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention.”).
37
Sonia Morano-Foadi & Stelios Andreadakis, Reflections on the
Architechture of the EU After the Treaty of Lisbon: The European Judicial
Approach to Fundamental Rights, 17 EUR. L. J. 595, 600 (2011),
http://www.cesruc.org/uploads/soft/130303/1-130303200129.pdf.
38
RICK A. LAWSON, Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the
European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg, THE
DYNAMICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE - ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR HENRY G. SCHERMERS 219, 228 (R.A. Lawson & M.
de Blois, eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers vol. III 1994) (footnote omitted).
39
Article 52(3) of the European Charter states in part, “[i]n so far as this
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention[.]” See European Charter, supra note 21, at art. 52(3).
40
Julianne Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union After Lisbon 2 (European Univ. Inst. Acad. of European
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The CJEU was not charged with making a global public policy
recommendation but instead with answering specific questions of
European law.41 The CJEU applied the law narrowly, addressing
only the question of what constitutes a relevant and proportionate
response to a search query of Mr. Costeja González’s name.42
While the CJEU might appropriately be criticized for failing to
take into consideration the policy impact of its decisions, the CJEU
is only officially charged with answering the questions of
European law posed to it by member state courts.
IV.
ANALYSIS: THE MAIN QUESTIONS
Google Spain addresses three questions. The first question
relates to jurisdiction: should the erasure rights provision of the
Directive (under which the Spanish data protection law is
implemented) apply to Google with respect to the Google search
engine’s response to a query, when that query is the name of an
individual living in Spain, and the results provide links to the
website of a Spanish newspaper?43 The second question examines
the role of the data processor and data controller: 44 if the
provisions of the Directive apply to this type of search, should
Google and/or its Spanish subsidiary be considered “controllers”
(as defined by the Directive) who are processing (as defined by the
Law, EUI Working Paper No. AEL 2010/6, 2010), http://cadmus.eui.eu/
bitstream/handle/1814/15208/AEL_WP_2010_06.pdf?sequence=3.
41
Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc.
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 20 (June 25, 2013).
42
Id. at ¶ 98.
43
Id. at ¶ 20.
44
Article 2(e) defines a data processor as, “a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of
the controller.” Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 2(e). Article 2(d)
defines a data controller as:
the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means
of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of
processing are determined by national or Community laws or
regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination
may be designated by national or Community law.
Id. at art. 2(d).
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Directive) personal data?45 The third question evaluates the notion
of removal: should an individual have the ability to lodge a
complaint to prevent a search engine from linking to information
lawfully published by third parties?46 Each of these questions are
now examined in turn to analyze the reasoning of the CJEU.
A. Jurisdiction
The Google Spain decision relies heavily on the European
Union’s Article 29 Working Party 2008 analysis of jurisdiction
found in its Opinion 1/2008 (“WP 148”).47 That opinion, in effect,
states that an entity is subject to the laws of jurisdictions to which
it purposefully avails itself.48
The European Union’s Article 29 Working Party previously
analyzed the issue of whether the Directive should apply to search
engines that are not located in an EU member state.49 According to
the analysis, EU data protection law applies in two specific
situations: (1) when the search engine has an “establishment” in
45

The Directive defines the “processing” of data as “any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination
or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
destruction.” Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(b).
46
The Directive defines “third parties” as “any natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or any other body other than the data subject, the controller,
the processor and the persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or
the processor, are authorized to process the data.” Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(f).
47
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Opinion 1/2008 on Data
Protection Issues Related to Search Engines 00737/EN/WP 148, (Apr. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter WP29 Opinion], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2008/wp148_en.pdf.
48
See, e.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 29 (Article 29 of
the Directive calls for the establishment of a “working party” of national data
protection authorities.); see also id. at art. 30. The working group advises the
European Commission on the latest challenges in European data privacy, makes
recommendations on new legislation and assesses the level of “adequacy” of
protection in third-countries. See generally Burkard Eberlein & Abraham L.
Newman, Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated
Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union, 21 GOVERNANCE 25, 38–
39 (2008).
49
WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 8–11.
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the EU Member state;50 and (2) when the search engine makes use
of equipment in the EU Member state. 51 The analysis is of
particular interest in the case of Google Spain, because it focuses
on the protection of the personal data of the individual entering the
search query, rather than on protection of the individual who is the
subject of the query.52 It clearly states that an entity does have an
“establishment” when it creates “an office in a Member state
(“EEA”) that is involved in the selling of targeted advertisements
to the inhabitants of that state[,]” as long as those advertisements
“play a relevant role in the particular processing operation.” 53
However, it also says that the use of equipment will not qualify as
an “establishment” if used “only for purposes of transit through the
territory.”54
The CJEU ultimately determined that Google’s Spanish
subsidiary was in the business of selling advertising linked to the
display of search results of the query of Mr. Costeja González’s
name.55 Therefore, it never took up the issue of whether Google’s
use of automated indexing software on the Internet would
constitute the “use of equipment” sufficient to satisfy the
establishment requirement.
The CJEU’s adoption of the Working Party’s analysis is not
surprising: it comports with generally accepted United States law
about international jurisdiction that subjects an entity to the laws of
jurisdictions of which it purposefully avails itself. 56 The CJEU
concluded that when Google set up an entity in Spain to sell
advertising related to search query results, it became subject to the
Spanish data protection law. 57 In other words, organizations
50

Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 4(1)(a).
Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 4(1)(c).
52
WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 6–7.
53
WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 10.
54
WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 10–11.
55
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at
¶¶ 55–57 (May 13, 2014).
56
Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 119,
175.
57
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 57.
51
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engaged in moneymaking activities targeting a particular country
are subject to its laws.
B. Data Controller & Processing
If Google’s sale of advertising in Spain subjects it to Spanish
data protection law, it is necessary to consider the CJEU’s analysis
of whether Google was a “controller” that was “processing”
personal data according to the Directive.
The CJEU found that Google is a Controller under the
definition in the Directive, because Google determines the purpose
and means of organizing personal data. 58 Article 2(d) of the
Directive defines a Controller as “the natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly
with others determines the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data . . . .” 59 With respect to the indexing of the
personal data included in the results of the search queries, the
CJEU concluded without much analysis that Google “determines
the purposes and means” by the nature of its algorithm organizing
the personal data to determine which search results to display, and
in what order to display them.60
The CJEU spent more time analyzing whether by providing
those search engine results, Google was “processing” personal data
under the law. Article 2(b) of the Directive defines “processing” as
“any operation or set of operations which is performed upon
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as
collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.” 61 It found that
Google is “processing data” based on its analysis that Google’s
58

Id. at ¶ 41.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 2(d).
60
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 33 (“It is the search engine operator
which determines the purposes and means of that activity and thus of the
processing of personal data that it itself carries out within the framework of that
activity and which must, consequently, be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect
of that processing pursuant to Article 2(d).”).
61
Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
59
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search engine does not simply transmit information but processes
and organizes information to help individuals find answers to
questions.62
The CJEU’s interpretation of this definition is particularly
important. If information intermediaries are found to be
“processing personal data” merely by transmitting information
through their equipment or software, then application of the law
could create a substantial barrier and cost for the operation of the
Internet.63 The primary question is whether Google’s search engine
functions more like a telephone service provider 64 that simply
allows the information to pass through, or more like a private
investigator who helps individuals find the answers to their
questions.
The merits of the CJEU’s analysis of this issue are open to
debate. The CJEU appears to comment on Google’s indexing
activities when it states:
in exploring the internet automatically, constantly and systematically in
search of the information which is published there, the operator of a
search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves’,
‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the framework of its indexing
programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’
and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of search results.65

The CJEU appears to rely upon the fact that Google displays
results “according to a particular order of preference” and therefore
must be deemed to be “processing personal data.”66 The CJEU’s
conclusion is also supported by the Working Party opinion on
search engines, which states: “Search engines process information,
including personal information, by crawling, analysing and

62

Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 55 (May 13, 2014).
The internet relies on a variety of hardware, software and services to allow
information to be transmitted globally. If all companies who produce these
products and services were held responsible for the content sent over the
internet, then it would be a substantial disincentive for companies to provide
these products.
64
It is the telephone service provider’s role as an information intermediary to
take data from point A to point B, without modifying that data in any way.
65
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 28 (May 13, 2014).
66
Id. at ¶ 20–21 & ¶ 41.
63
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indexing the World Wide Web and other sources they make
searchable and thereby easily accessible through these services.”67
Google’s success in the marketplace has depended on its ability
to accurately determine which results individuals want to see. The
CJEU appears to be saying that indexing based on importance to
the searcher makes the company’s search engine activities function
more like a private investigator and less like a telephone service
provider.
The CJEU’s conclusion may be difficult to align with the body
of law in Europe and the United States that determines whether an
information intermediary can be liable for the content delivered
over its website and network. In the European Union (“EU”), the
controlling legal instrument on this issue is the E-commerce
Directive. 68 Article 12 of the EU’s E-commerce Directive
addresses the definition of an information intermediary by asking
whether the Internet service is acting as a “mere conduit” of the
information.69 Under this definition, the EU exempts the company
from liability if it satisfies the following three conditions: (a) does
not initiate the transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the
transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information in
the results. In the Google case, the CJEU appears to be of the
opinion that Google’s use of an algorithm to index information and
determine which results to provide to the search query causes it to
fail part (c) of this test, as it “selects” the information in the results.
Other countries have different standards for determining
information intermediary liability, and may come to a different

67

WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 13.
See Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic
commerce’) 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter E-commerce Directive], http://eur-l
ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:en:HTML.
69
Id. at ¶ 44 (stating that “[a] service provider who deliberately collaborates
with one of the recipients of his service in order to undertake illegal acts goes
beyond the activities of ‘mere conduit’ or ‘caching’ and as a result cannot
benefit from the liability exemptions established for these activities”).
68
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result.70 However, it is odd that Google has contended in their
statements about the CJEU’s ruling that it is an information
intermediary that should not be subject to restrictions based on the
information delivered through its service, and at the same time
asserted that it is a speaker being censored by being prohibited
from displaying the results that its algorithm determines to best
respond to the query.71
C. Removal of Search Engine Link
Given the basis for the CJEU determination that Google is
subject to Spanish data protection law, and that Google satisfies
the definitions of “controller” and “processing” in this context,
analysis turns to how the CJEU interpreted the Directive. Popular
media outlets incorrectly report that the CJEU’s opinion
establishes a “right to be forgotten.”72 While that term describes an
element of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation
(“Regulation”) 73 currently under consideration which would
replace the Directive, the way in which the question was posed in
the case created some of this confusion. For example, the Spanish
Court asked the CJEU the following:
3. Regarding the scope of the right of erasure and/or the right to object,
in relation to the derecho al olvido, [the right to be forgotten] the
70

See e.g., Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2015) (granting
immunity to third-party publishers like search engines and service providers
from libel, defamation and other privacy torts).
71
David Drummond, We Need to Talk about the Right to be Forgotten, THE
GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014, 5:05PM), http://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-ruling-google-debate (“[T]he
Guardian could have an article on its website about an individual that’s perfectly
legal, but we might not legally be able to show links to it in our results when you
search for that person’s name. It’s a bit like saying the book can stay in the
library but cannot be included in the library’s card catalogue.”).
72
See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, THE NEW YORKER (Sept.
29, 2014) http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion
(“The Court went on to say . . . that all individuals in the countries within its
jurisdiction had the right to prohibit Google from linking to items that were
‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they were processed and in the light of the time that has
elapsed.’”) (emphasis added).
73
See GDPR Proposal, infra note 82.
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following question is asked: must it be considered that the rights to
erasure and blocking of data, provided for in Article 12(b), and the
right to object, provided for by Article 14(a), of Directive 95/46/EC,
extend to enabling the data subject to address himself to search engines
in order to prevent indexing of the information relating to him
personally, published on third parties’ web pages, invoking his wish
that such information should not be known to internet users when he
considers that it might be prejudicial to him or he wishes it to be
consigned to oblivion, even though the information in question has
been lawfully published by third parties?74

This question is a fairly straightforward request for analysis of
the provisions of the Directive. However, both the language in the
header, stating that the question should be evaluated in the context
of derecho al olvido and its inclusion of a phrase about the
individual asking that the information be “consigned to oblivion”
(also emphasized) create an impression that the CJEU’s holding is
broader that it is in fact.75
The CJEU spends little time considering what it means to be
“forgotten” or “consigned to oblivion.” In fact, the CJEU’s
responses to the four questions referred to it do not include the
words “forgotten,” “forgetting” or “oblivion.” The CJEU’s
analysis only includes these words to refer back to the Spanish
CJEU’s questions76 or to reference arguments made by the parties
to the case.77 Rather, the CJEU spends the majority of its opinion
describing how Mr. Costeja González’s request for deletion of the
links fits squarely within Article 6(1)(c) of the Directive.78
The Directive’s Article 6(1)(c) requires “that personal data
must be . . . adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed.”79
The CJEU analyzes this provision of the Directive by asking what

74

Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶
20 (May 13, 2014).
75
Id.
76
Id. at ¶ 89.
77
Id. at ¶¶ 90–91.
78
Id. at ¶ 72 & ¶ 92.
79
Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 6(1)(c).
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the “further processing” of the information was in this context.80
On this point, the CJEU applies the law quite narrowly, and states
several times that it is only asking the question of which results are
a relevant and proportionate response to a search query of Mr.
Costeja González’s name.81 The CJEU does not determine whether
those same results would have been appropriate for searches of
“Costeja González real estate auction,” “La Vanguardia social
security debts,” or “1998 real estate auctions.” Given the repeated
language in the opinion limiting application of the ruling only to
results responding to queries of Mr. González’s name, it is
reasonable to think the CJEU may have decided that the linked
pages at issue in the case would have been appropriate for searches
specifically targeting Mr. González’s real estate affairs and social
security debts.
So why has this limited ruling created such a stir about a socalled “right to be forgotten?” Many legal commentators and
companies have expressed concern with the EU’s attempts to place
a “right to be forgotten” in the General Data Protection
Regulation.82 As originally proposed by the European Commission,
80

Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc.
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 98 (June 25, 2013).
81
Id.
82
See Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 17, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
[hereinafter GDPR Proposal]. See also Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of
the Right to be Delisted, VAND. J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming, 2016)
(manuscript at 4, note 5) (explaining that both the European Parliament and the
European Council have adopted different possible versions of the GDPR). For a
comparative table demonstrating the differences between the proposals, see
Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General
Data Protection Regulation), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eucouncil-dp-reg-trilogue-10391-15.pdf [hereinafter GDPR Comparison Chart].
European lawmakers aim to have a final text at the conclusion of the trilogues
period at the end of 2015. As of December 2015, regulation was still in the
“trilogue” process. Trilogues are an informal part of the European Union
decision making process whereby representatives from the Commission,
Council of Ministers and European Parliament gather to pre-negotiate politically
urgent legislation. Agreements that are borne out of the trilogues process are
later ratified through the formal decision making processes of the Union. The
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the GDPR would have established this right and obligated online
publishers to delete sources or posted references to sites where
personal data were originally posted or processed.83 Had such a
provision been implemented it might have created some type of
“forgetting” or “oblivion.” However, this language was widely
criticized as impossible to implement and was not included in the
GDPR as adopted.84
More recent language from the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union substantially narrowed the
obligation to closely reflect the provisions in Article 6(1)(c) of the
Directive.85 While the relevant provision’s title still includes the
phrase “The Right to be Forgotten,” the requirements created by
the text are similar to those of Article 6(1)(c) of the Directive.86

purpose of the process is to find an accord on a package of amendments
acceptable to both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.
Negotiations often take about a year but can help fast-track legislation through
the political process. See, e.g., Christine Reh, Is Informal Politics
Undemocratic? Triologues, Early Agreements and the Selection Model of
Representation, 21 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL. 822, 829 (2014).
83
See GDPR Comparison Chart, supra note 82.
84
Id. The Commission Language stated:
(53) Any person should have the right to have personal data concerning
them rectified and a ‘right to be forgotten’ where the retention of such
data is not in compliance with this Regulation. In particular, data
subjects should have the right that their personal data are erased and no
longer processed, where the data are no longer necessary in relation to
the purposes for which the data are collected or otherwise processed,
where data subjects have withdrawn their consent for processing or
where they object to the processing of personal data concerning them
or where the processing of their personal data otherwise does not
comply with this Regulation. This right is particularly relevant, when
the data subject has given their consent as a child, when not being fully
aware of the risks involved by the processing, and later wants to
remove such personal data especially on the Internet.
Id. (emphasis added).
85
GDPR Comparison Chart, supra note 83.
86
Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 6(1)(c) (“Member States
shall provide that personal data must be . . . adequate, relevant and not excessive
in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed.”).
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D. The Balancing Test
The CJEU relied on the legal obligation set forth in the
Directive that data be “adequate, relevant and not excessive” in
determining that the processing purpose of indexing information
based only on a query of an individual’s name did not outweigh the
impact on the individual’s privacy.87 The CJEU’s opinion, contrary
to its depiction in the media, creates a narrow, fact-based
determination that sixteen-year-old real estate debts are not
relevant enough in this context. The CJEU determined that in this
instance the purpose of indexing information just based on a search
query of an individual’s name did not outweigh the potential
impact on the individual’s right to privacy.88
However, neither the Spanish Court, nor the CJEU, required
that the underlying newspaper articles should be deleted from the
Internet. Interestingly, the CJEU, in a sense, said that Google’s
algorithm did a poor job of indexing the search results.89 Google
attempts to provide search results that are as relevant as possible
for the searcher. 90 Individuals who want to know as much as
possible about another person (for example, a parent searching on
the name of a prospective babysitter), may view even financial
data dating back sixteen years as relevant. Google’s market share
in Internet searching appears to indicate that the company is quite
good at producing relevant results.

87

Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶
72 (May 13, 2014). See also Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 6.
88
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 91 (explaining that the plaintiff “may
oppose the indexing by a search engine of personal data relating to him where
their dissemination through the search engine is prejudicial to him and his
fundamental rights to the protection of those data and to privacy — which
encompass the ‘right to be forgotten’ — override the legitimate interests of the
operator of the search engine and the general interest in freedom of
information.”).
89
Id. at ¶ 92–93.
90
Will Oremus, Google’s Big Break, SLATE (Oct. 13, 2013, 11:50 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/when_big_businesses_were_small/2013/
10/google_s_big_break_how_bill_gross_goto_com_inspired_the_adwords_busi
ness.html.
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The CJEU’s opinion raises additional questions. Even if some
search results are deemed relevant, when would these results be
deemed excessive? What does “excessive” mean in the context of a
search engine? These are important questions, but the facts of this
case did not require the CJEU to fully examine them. Instead, the
CJEU appears to rely upon the facts that the newspaper articles
were sixteen years old and were not currently relevant to a search
of Mr. Costeja González’s name.
This case suggests consideration of a hypothetical Internet
company called www.spyonyourneighbor.com, and whether
privacy legislation should prohibit the use of personal data to spy
on individuals. It may be that the business of
www.spyonyourneighbor.com is not hypothetical at all, but rather
an aspect of the way search engines function. The CJEU addressed
this capability of search engines straight on, and determined that
displaying results to a search engine query of an individual’s name
requires that those results comply with Article 6 of the Directive.91
While this ruling creates complexity and highlights important
policy considerations related to the free flow of information, it
does not result in complete “forgetting,” as more precise searches
could still provide results that link to the information.
Moreover, the result is not surprising, as it is a straightforward
interpretation of the relevancy requirements of Article 6.92 The
result is, therefore, much more about obscurity than it is about a
right to be forgotten. The ruling has the effect of obscuring
information from searches solely based on a name, when the
search results are irrelevant or excessive. The author has also
written about the value of using obscurity to protect privacy.93 And
91

Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc.
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 48 (June 25, 2013) (“An internet search engine
service provider may automatically acquire personal data relating to its users
. . . .”).
92
For an explanation of “relevancy requirement,” see supra notes 74–76 and
accompanying text.
93
David Hoffman, How Obscurity Could Help the Right to Fail, POLICY @
INTEL BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013) https://blogs.intel.com/policy/2013/03/29/howobscurity-could-help-the-right-to-fail/ (explaining that obscurity is a rational
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for those who incorrectly assume these concepts of relevance and
obscurity are only European or theoretical, one commentator has
described both how these important concepts form the basis for
some of the United States’ most effective privacy legislation, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act.94
E. Comparing Google Spain to European Court of Human Rights
Free Expression Jurisprudence
This section looks to the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”) case law for principles for evaluating conflicts between
privacy and free expression. Critical to any analysis of the Google
Spain opinion is its impact on free expression. The Charter of
Fundamental Rights not only includes Articles 7 and 8 as
mentioned above, but also Article 11: the Right to Freedom of
Expression and Information.95 The Charter’s Article 11 was largely
based on the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights
Article 10.96
desire because individuals need “a sphere of privacy where they know they can
make mistakes, without those errors following them for the rest of their lives”).
94
Martin Abrams, Context & Balance, THE INFO. ACCOUNTABILITY FOUND.
BLOG (Jul. 14, 2014), http://informationaccountability.org (“Many have argued
that the limits built into the FCRA [Fair Credit Reporting Act] are an abuse of
free expression. However, the context is a societal value that old payment data
should not affect employment, credit, or insurance.”).
95
European Charter, supra, note 21, art. 11, (Freedom of expression and
information) states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers;
(2) The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.
Id.
96
European Convention, supra note 31, at art. 10. Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
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The CJEU’s minimalist mode of analysis and opinion writing
provides little clarity with respect to many of the legal issues in
Google Spain, among them how to balance privacy against
freedom of expression.97 A curious CJEU omission is an analysis
of ECHR case law on this point. As one commentator noted,
“[T]he judgment appears to dismiss important considerations that
can conflict with the right to be forgotten, such as the rights of
freedom of expression and access to information . . . .” 98 The
ECHR is no stranger to data protection and privacy law issues,
therefore it is puzzling that the CJEU chose not to look to some of
the ECHR’s cases.99 Three cases have been brought before the
ECHR that are directly on point, namely Axel Springer AG v.

restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Id.

97

Other commentators have criticized the CJEU’s balancing approach in
Google Spain. See e.g., Christopher Kuner, The Court of Justice of the EU
Judgment on Data Protection and Internet Search Engines, 3/2015 LONDON
SCHOOL OF ECON. AND POL. SCI. (LSE) LAW, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY WORKING
PAPER SERIES 1, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496060; Eleni Frantziou, Further
Developments in the Right to be Forgotten: The European Court of Justice’s
Judgment in Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola
de Proteccion de Datos, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 761 (2014); Michael L.
Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right To Be Forgotten To
Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349 (2015).
98
FRANTZIOU, supra note 97, at 762.
99
Cross-references between the two CJEUs have been increasing over time,
reaching over 57 mentions in 2011. Elena Butti, The Roles and Relationship
between the Two European CJEUs in Post-Lisbon EU Human Rights
Protection, JURIST (Sept. 12, 2013), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/09/elenabutti-lisbon-treaty.php.
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Germany, 100 Von Hannover v. Germany, 101 and Węgrzynowski &
Smolczewski v. Poland.102
Axel Springer AG and Von Hannover were two cases involving
well-known public figures attempting to enjoin media outlets from
publishing (potentially) damaging information about their private
lives.103 The ECHR in both instances articulated a detailed test to
provide guidance on how to evaluate the tension between free
expression (Article 10) and privacy (Article 8). 104 In both
judgments, the ECHR explains that, “Where the right to freedom
100

2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 227, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034.
(No. 2), 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001109029.
102
Wegrzynowski & Smolczewski v. Poland, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 224,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122365.
103
Axel Springer AG, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 227 at ¶¶ 9–15; Von Hannover, 2012
Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at ¶¶ 10–15.
104
European Convention, supra note 31. Art. 8 (Respect for private and
family life) states:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
Art. 10 (Freedom of expression) states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention, supra note 31. Art. 10.
101

462

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 437

of expression is being balanced against the right to respect for
private life, the criteria laid down in the case-law that are relevant
to the present case are set out” in a six-point test. 105 The test
requires the ECHR to examine: (1) contribution to a debate of
general interest; (2) how well-known is the person concerned and
what is the subject of the report; (3) prior conduct of the person
concerned; (4) method of obtaining the information and its
veracity/circumstances in which the [media] was published or
acquired; (5) content, form, and consequences of the publication;
and (6) the severity of the sanction imposed by the local courts.106
The interplay of the values underlying Article 8 and Article 10 are
well expressed in elements of the six-point test. Critics of Google
Spain might have been more satisfied with the decision had the
CJEU applied a detailed analysis of the facts as seen through the
lens of this test.
In Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski v. Poland two lawyers filed
suit against an online news media website that allegedly published
libelous information about them.107 When the local court refused to
hear their request to have the article removed from print, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint with the ECHR, arguing that Polish
Government breached their rights to respect for their private life
and reputation, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention.108
Here, the ECHR did not reiterate the Springer-Hannover test, but
they did mention both cases in the decisions. 109 The ECHR
expressed reservations about applying offline media regulations to
the Internet, stating:
[t]he Internet is an information and communication tool particularly
distinct from the printed media, especially as regards [to] the capacity
to store and transmit information. The electronic network, serving
105

Von Hannover, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at ¶ 108. See also Axel Springer,
2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 227 at ¶ 89.
106
Von Hannover, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at ¶ 108.
107
Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google
Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶¶ 6–7 (June 25, 2013).
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billions of users worldwide, is not and potentially will never be subject
to the same regulations and control.110

The ECHR went on to explain that it “accepts that it is not the
role of judicial authorities to engage in rewriting history by
ordering the removal from the public domain of all traces of
publication which have in the past been found . . . .”111 Here, too,
critics of the Google Spain judgment could point to the
Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski decision for the argument that it was
not the role of the CJEU to enable a revision of historically truthful
data by requiring suppression or erasure. 112 But finally, as in
Google Spain, the ECHR in Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski
recognizes “the risk of harm posed by content and communications
on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is
certainly higher than that posed by the press.”113 Therefore, despite
the ECHR’s dicta about the importance of the internet and the free
flow of data, the Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski case is not so
different from the Google Spain ruling that recognizes the
possibility of protecting privacy when there is only limited impact
on the freedom of expression.
Given the direct applicability of these cases, it is unfortunate
that the CJEU did not include analysis of the relevant ECHR case
law in the Google Spain decision. If the CJEU had looked to the
ECHR cases it likely would not have issued a different ruling;
however, it would have provided more clarity about the extent to
which the ruling should be applied to different facts.
Let us suppose that the CJEU adopted the Springer-Hannover
test. Google’s processing of Mr. Casteja González’s data would
fail this test, as publication of sixteen-year old fully repaid debts
from a non-public figure is not critical for the preservation of free
110

Wegrzynowski & Smolczewski, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 224, at ¶ 58 (quotations
omitted).
111
Id. at ¶ 65.
112
Critics may also point to Frantziou, supra note 97 at 774 (noting that while
the Google Spain case is not necessarily incompatible with the ECHR, the
ECHR’s judgment in Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski suggests that such
incompatibility cannot be ruled out either.).
113
Wegrzynowski & Smolczewski, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 224, at ¶ 58.
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expression. Nevertheless, such analysis is valuable and would have
provided useful guidance for businesses, policymakers, and
academics. The Google Spain Advocate General’s report warned
the CJEU that asserting the existence of a right to be forgotten or
any similar iterance of such a right would be problematic. It stated
that enforcement of a right to be forgotten would call into question
its compatibility with other fundamental rights, already inked into
the Charter. 114 The lack of explanatory guidance in the CJEU
opinion created the uncertainty the Advocate General warned
against.
In the following sections, the paper explores this global
uncertainty and recommends how to move forward with
implementation that would establish criteria for decisions about
delisting, enhance legal certainty for companies making these
decisions, and minimize the impact on free expression.
V.
IMPLEMENTATION OF GOOGLE SPAIN: GLOBAL IMPACT
The effects of the Google Spain decision and the “right to
obscurity” have reverberated worldwide, causing organizations to
rethink the complex issues surrounding privacy and freedom of
expression.115 Individuals around the world express concern about
the degree to which people can access information about them,
while they increasingly use Internet tools to discover information
about others (job candidates, child care givers, prospective
romantic partners, neighbors, teachers, etc.). Policymakers
worldwide are re-examining the degree to which individuals
should be able to “know” each other. Countries such as France,
Canada, Russia, Hong Kong and South Korea are attempting to
determine how much access to information about individuals is
appropriate.116
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Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google
Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 81 (June 25, 2013).
115
Phil Muncaster, Firms Already Swamped by Right to be Forgotten
Requests,
INFOSECURITY,
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In an age of easy access to sensitive personal information,
countries’ interest in fostering individuals’ obscurity is
understandable. Search engines and data brokers have
quantitatively and qualitatively changed the ability to access
information about individuals, no matter how private, and no
matter what the potential risk the information creates. Access to
information is now global—anyone on the planet can instantly
probe the details about a person located anywhere around the
world. This unprecedented access to the details of others’ lives
highlights the conflicting way varying cultures view governments’
need to protect citizens from harm and from observation by
others.117
Countries are responding to this issue in a variety of ways.
Some countries are attempting to enforce delisting requests beyond
EU borders. 118 Other non-European countries are weighing the
consequences of introducing their local flavor of obscurity into
their Internet, data protection, and cyber security laws. 119 What
follows are examples of how different countries are dealing with
the issue.
A. France
In Europe, issues surrounding data protection, privacy and
freedom of expression do not end with the CJEU decision. Many
post-Google Spain challenges remain, in particular for member
states who must address citizens’ concerns about data protection,
erasure, obscurity, and freedom of expression.120 The Article 29
Working Party issued guidelines asserting that, “Under EU law,
everyone has a right to data protection . . . . Decisions must be
117

For an excellent book discussing these developments, see VIKTOR MAYERSCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(Princeton Univ. Press, 2011).
118
Samuel Gibbs, French Data Regulator Rejects Google’s Right-to-beForgotten Appeal, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2015), www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/sep/21/French-google-right-to-be-forgotten-appeal.
119
See infra Part V.
120
Jeff J. Roberts, Google Defies France over “Right to be Forgotten,”
FORTUNE (Jul. 30, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/30/google-france-right-tobe-forgotten/.
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implemented in such a way that they guarantee the effective and
complete protection of data subjects’ rights and that EU law cannot
be circumvented.”121 Although the opinions issued by the working
group are non-binding, they can be influential. The French privacy
regulators appear to have found this language particularly
persuasive, given the French regulator’s subsequent engagements
with Google. Since the ruling was handed down, France has been
at the forefront of this dialogue and the post-decision
implementation process.
In June 2015, La Commission National de l’Informatique et des
Libertes (“CNIL”),122 the French privacy regulatory body, ruled
that Google was required to abide by “obscurity” requests in
France, not only locally, but globally. 123 Although the search
engine automatically directs users in France to Google’s French
domain (google.fr) by analyzing the location of the connecting
Internet protocol address, French citizens are still able to access
Google’s other international domains (e.g., google.com,
google.ca). At first, the CNIL’s orders mirrored the CJEU ruling in
that the CNIL’s removal requests were specific to the Google
France domain.124 However, cognizant of the fact that users around
the world can easily redirect their search inquiries to other Google
sites, the CNIL sought to prevent users from accessing the
121

Mark Scott, France Wants Google to Apply Right to Be Forgotten Ruling
Worldwide of Face Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/french-regulator-wants-google-to-appl
y-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-worldwide/.
122
CNIL’s purpose, generally, is to educate its citizens about impending
privacy issues, to protect its citizens from privacy and civil liberty harms, to
regulate issues dealing with privacy and the digital economy, and to penalize
those that violate French privacy rules. CNIL is the administrative body
responsible for enforcing the erasure requests. See Role and Responsibilities,
CNIL, https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-missions.
123
See CNIL Orders Google to Apply Delisting on All Domain Names of the
Search Engine, CNIL (June 12, 2015) http://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/actualite/
article/article/cnil-orders-google-to-apply-delisting-on-all-domain-names-of-the
-search-engine/ (“CNIL considers that in order to be effective, delisting must be
carried out on all extensions of the search engine and that the service provided
by Google search constitutes a single processing.”).
124
Id.
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suppressed information at any and all access points. 125 In their
view, to do otherwise would render a removal order ineffective.126
French authorities gave Google two weeks to apply the ruling
across all of its domains or face fines of over $350,000.127 The
company appealed the CNIL’s ruling.128 But in September 2015,
the CNIL rejected Google’s effort to limit the worldwide
application of the ruling for French applicants or face financial
penalties.129 Any potential fine will be appealed in French courts.130
Google’s appeal to the CNIL was rejected largely because of the
regulator’s concern about the ease with which the right to obscurity
could be circumvented.131
The CNIL attempted to mitigate concerns about its worldwide
removal request by explaining that any information sought can still
be accessed at its original sources and that removal of the
information is not absolute.132 However, it appears that the CNIL is
not just worried about citizens in France seeing the non-relevant
material. Instead, it seems the CNIL wants to make certain that no
one in the world is able to do an Internet search to reveal the
information.133
It remains to be seen whether Google will propose to the CNIL
alternative ways to carry out its orders, such as by increasing the
degree to which it blocks access to other Google domains inside of
125

Id.
Id.
127
Commission Nationale de L’Informatique et des Libertes, CNIL Orders
Google to Apply Delisting on All Domain Names of the Search Engine, CNIL
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France. Google could accomplish this by preventing users from
manually overriding the selection of Google.fr. Individuals could
still use other methods, such as spoofing IP addresses134 from other
geographies to access Google.com. Moreover, it is unclear the
extent to which the CNIL would force Google to silo its services
geographically, and the degree to which French CJEUs would
continue to find jurisdiction over those non-French domains. Also,
as mentioned above, none of these efforts will accomplish the
CNILs goal to protect French citizens from people accessing
information outside of France. This conflict is one that many
Internet companies will likely face as they attempt to provide
global services that conflict with local laws and cultures. 135
Implementation challenges are not unique to the European
continent. France is just one example.
B. Other EU Member States
The Spanish implementing legislation requires that the Spanish
court now issue its own ruling in accordance with the CJEU
opinion. Similarly, each individual EU Member State data
protection authority will need to interpret the opinion as they apply
their national laws. The fragmentation that will result from the
application of twenty-eight member state laws will pose serious
compliance problem for global companies. The CJEU held that
data from sixteen years ago is too old to be relevant in the context
of the facts of the Google Spain case. 136 How does a court
determine at what point or under what circumstances data is no
longer relevant? It is difficult to predict how twenty-eight different
134

In computer networking, Internet Protocol (“IP”) address spoofing or IP
spoofing is the creation of IP packets with a forged source IP address, with the
purpose of concealing the identity of the sender or impersonating another
computing system. See IP Spoofing, CISCO.COM, http://www.cisco.com/web/
about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_10-4/104_ip-spoofing.html.
135
See, e.g., Peter Fleischer, Implementing a European, Not Global, Right to
be
Forgotten,
GOOGLE
EUROPE
BLOG
(July
30,
2015),
http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2015/07/implementing-european-notglobal-right.html.
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Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶
98 (May 13, 2014).
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member states will interpret the need to optimize the rights of the
individual and the “preponderant interest of the general public
. . . .”137
The CJEU is not charged with addressing concerns about
harmonization, and its decision creates a pressing need for further
guidance. It also points to one of the problems posed by the
European system in which the Directive creates a regulatory floor,
but not a ceiling for member states. The case illustrates why it is
important to further pursue harmonization mechanisms like the
“one-stop-shop,” which the European Commission proposed in the
Draft General Data Protection Regulation as a means to provide
more predictability and certainty across Europe.138
C. Canada
The British Columbia Supreme Court in Canada dealt with the
issue of the ability of Internet search engines to provide global
access to information, and how privacy and freedom of expression
should be balanced. In Equustek Solutions, Inc. v. Datalink
Technologies, Inc., 139 an appellate court in British Columbia
required Google to remove sensitive intellectual property
information from the results provided by all of its local and
international search engines. 140 In Equustek, the complaining
company filed suit against a hardware distributor for distributing
Equustek products under its own name.141 The underlying case was
a fairly uncontroversial Canadian trademark infringement case to
which Google was not a party. Equustek applied to the British
137

See Press Release No 70/14, supra note 1.
See generally The One-Stop-Shop Mechanism, COUNCIL OF THE EU
6833/15 (2015), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ srv?l=EN&f=ST%2068
33%202015%20INIT (discussing how the GDPR Proposal’s “One-Stop-Shop”
was created in hopes of providing for more uniformity in data protection
enforcement. The mechanism is supposed to allocate responsibility for
supervising data controllers and data processors that are working in several
different European markets to a “main establishment” so that it eliminates the
complexities of having to work with a different data protection authority in
whatever jurisdiction the controller or processor operates).
139
Equustek Sols. Inc. v. DataLink Technologies, [2014] BCSC 1063 (Can.).	
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Id. at ¶ 9 (Can.).
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Id. at ¶¶ 4–5.
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Columbia Supreme Court for an injunction ordering Google to
remove all links to Datalink websites from all searches conducted
worldwide.142
There is precedent in Canadian law for issuing interlocutory
orders to protect Canadian companies from further trade secret or
intellectual property rights violations. 143 Therefore, the fact that
Google was not a party to the underlying litigation did not prevent
the court from making the order. 144 Google claimed that the
injunction should not have been granted because (1) the
application did not have a sufficient connection to the Province to
give the Supreme Court of British Columbia competence to deal
with the matter and (2) “the extraterritorial reach of the injunction
is inappropriate and a violation of the principles of comity.”145 The
Supreme Court granted the injunction, because it was sympathetic
to the plaintiff’s argument that effective protection of its trademark
would require global obscurity so that it could be properly
protected.146
As in France, the Equustek court advocated for worldwide
removal of specific information from all Google domains.147 The
court found a “real and substantial connection” between Google
and British Columbia through Google’s advertising activities,
using an analysis similar to that in Google Spain.148 Even though
Google houses no servers or offices in British Columbia, the court
found that the company had purposefully availed itself of Canadian
territory and thus should be subject to in personam jurisdiction.149
Advertising, the use of web crawler software, and similar business
142

Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.
See Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Google Inc., [2015] BCC 265, ¶ 69 (Can.); see
also judgment of Arnold J. in Cartier International AG v. British Sky
Broadcasting Limited [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch.) (Plaintiffs were granted
injunction order against a large number of British ISPs requiring them to block
access to websites that violate trademarks.).
144
See Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Jack, [2014] BCSC 1063, ¶ 2 (Can.).
145
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activities consisted of contacts sufficiently substantial to subject
Google to Canadian jurisdiction.150
Google attempted to make an extraterritoriality argument by
claiming that the court could not regulate the activities in foreign
jurisdictions due to pragmatism and comity. 151 But the court
explained that in personam jurisdiction is not limited by residency;
because Google does business in Canada, it may have jurisdiction
over it due to its activities.152 The court also found that concerns
about comity were overblown.153 “The only comity concern that
has been articulated in this case is the concern that the order made
by the trial judge could interfere with freedom of expression in
other countries.”154 The court doubted the potential of its decision
to affect other nations or to conflict with the fundamental
principles of other nations on freedom of expression and data
protection.155 Focusing on the intellectual property aspect of the
case, the court explained that the protection of intellectual property
rights should come before Google’s commercial advertising
business. 156 The court concluded that, internationally, it is not

150

Id. at ¶¶ 55–56.
Id. at ¶ 81 (“As a matter of law, the court is not competent to regulate the
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unusual for courts or regulatory bodies to issue such orders, despite
their potential complexities.157
D. Hong Kong
Allan Chiang, the head privacy official of Hong Kong, has
asked Google to “observe the right to be forgotten outside of
Europe”158 in the interest of protecting citizens’ privacy. However,
critics have expressed concern about the effect of such a policy,
stating that it could encourage Hong Kong government leaders to
follow the example of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and
substantially limit the free flow of information. 159 Currently
information flows in Hong Kong remain relatively protected and
unregulated except in instances related to media and publication
rights. 160 Regulation in Hong Kong is generally designed to
promote data flows.161 Nevertheless, policymakers in Hong Kong
are examining issues surrounding obscurity, freedom of expression
and the cross-border flow of data in the West.162
E. South Korea
Communication regulators in South Korea are evaluating
whether to introduce a “European-style” right to obscurity into
Korean law. 163 South Korean law already includes substantial
protections against online defamation, providing that individuals
may request that libelous or defamatory information be removed
157

Equustek Sols., [2015] BCC 265 at ¶¶ 95.
Simon Mundy, Asia Considers ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Ruling Prompted by
Google, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
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Consultation Paper on the Regulation of Media Intrusion, The Law
Reform Comm’n of Hong Kong Sub-Committee on Privacy, 14–17,
www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/media-e.doc.
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See Thomas Chan, New Hong Kong privacy chief vows to balance flow of
information,
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2015),
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from websites.164 South Korea regulators have discussed potentially
creating a new law that would allow for delisting from search
results in certain circumstances.165
F. Russia
Legislators in Russia have drafted a law that would provide the
right to obscurity to Russian citizens. The Russian law however,
goes beyond the framework established in Europe.166 In Europe,
Google set up a procedure whereby “people could point out links
they wanted removed from their own name-search results, along
with an explanation of why the content was ‘inadequate, irrelevant
or no longer relevant.’” 167 Google generally requires applicants
who request delisting to provide specific hyperlinks they wish to
have removed.168 The Russian bill requires only that applicants
indicate the information they want deleted.169
The ECHR case law is clear that public figures enjoy only a
limited right to privacy.170 However, “the Russian version extends
the right to erasure to public figures and information that is
considered in the public interest.”171 Search companies may deny a
request, but if the applicant appeals in court and wins, noncompliance could result in fines of over $50,000 per request.172
Considering that Google has had hundreds of thousands of requests
already within the EU, search engines face the prospect of
significant fines in Russia.
164
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See Olga Razumovskya, Russia Proposes Strict Online Right to Be
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G. The United States
The concepts explored in Google Spain are also covered in the
United States Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) analysis of the
data broker industry. 173 The FTC specifically called out the
challenges to privacy that come from data brokers that provide
“people search” services.174 The FTC unanimously recommended
in their report that Congress:
consider legislation requiring data brokers offering people search
products to: (1) allow consumers to access their own information; (2)
allow consumers to opt out of the use of the information; (3) clearly
disclose to consumers the data brokers’ sources of information, so that,
if possible, the consumer can correct his or her information at the
source; and (4) clearly disclose any limitations of the opt out, such as
the fact that close matches of an individual’s name may continue to
appear in search results.175

The FTC report highlights United States regulators’ concerns
about the privacy implications of services that allow easy access to
large amounts of an individual’s personal information based solely
on a search of that individual’s name.176 The FTC report points out
that this concern is not new, but was a motivation for enactment of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act in the 1970s.177 It also cites this
concern as the reason the Individual Reference Services Group
temporarily established a self-regulatory program to provide more
transparency with respect to people search services.178 The United
States has a long history of allowing for the “forgetting” of
information deemed to have a disproportionate impact on the
individual. 179 Most American states have laws that require the
173

See generally, Edith Ramirez et al., Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency
and Accountability, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountabilityreport-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Data Brokers Report].
174
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fallen and the reformation of the criminal” and that revealing plaintiff’s identity
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expunging of criminal records of minors.180 This motivation for
erasure of these criminal records is evidence of a cultural belief
that people should be allowed to make mistakes, suffer
consequences for their decisions, but then be permitted to move
on.181
Similarly, many states are pursuing “revenge porn” laws.182
These laws would provide individuals with the ability to block the
posting of explicit videos and pictures often made available by exlovers who want to embarrass and inflict emotional pain on their
former partners. While these videos are “truthful data,” often
recorded with the subject’s full knowledge, the United States
believes that making this truthful information available will have a
disproportionate impact on the individual.183
inhibited that right); see also Daniel Solove, What Google Must Forget: The EU
Ruling on the Right to Be Forgotten, LINKEDIN PULSE, (May 13, 2014),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140513230300-2259773-what-google-mustforget-the-eu-ruling-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten (explaining that “the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act provides for a right to delete personal data. The
Fair Credit Reporting Act restricts the ability of consumer reporting agencies to
report on bankruptcies and criminal proceedings that are beyond a certain
number of years old”). But see Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1940) (holding that one cannot easily ignore one’s status as a celebrity or a
public figure and thus attempt to control the dissemination of factual
information about one’s life despite already being a public figure).
180
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The limited ability in the United States to challenge
disproportionate truthful information often leads to strange results.
Take for instance the posting of the nude celebrity photos allegedly
accessed by hacking mobile phones. 184 Laws exist that prohibit
hacking digital devices.185 Laws also exist that prohibit those who
trespass on private property from taking unauthorized videos,
phone recordings, or pictures. 186 However, prosecuting the data
thief does not fully mitigate the harm to the victim if search
engines and data brokers will continue to direct people to the
content forever. While the hacked celebrities could not request
removal of the photos based on their need for privacy, they were
allowed to demand the pictures be taken down based on copyright
violations. 187 The celebrities, as the photographers, owned the
intellectual property rights to the photos.188 The United States legal
structure in this respect has valued intellectual property rights more
than privacy rights. If the images had been illegally photographed
by a third party through an open window, a hotel door peep hole or
an illegally installed wireless camera, the celebrities’ ability to
demand obscurity of the photos would be limited.

184

See, e.g., Mike Isacc, Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Are Latest Front
in Online Privacy Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/09/03/technology/trove-of-nude-photos-sparks-debate-over-onlinebehavior.html.
185
See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2010).
186
See, e.g., The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–
(c)(1)(C) (2012); see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/dmca (last visited Feb. 22,
2016) (explaining how the DMCA “safe harbor” provisions protect service
providers from liability by complying with “notice and takedown” procedures).
187
Alex Fitzpatrick, Here’s How Celebs Can Get Their Nude Selfies Taken
Down, TIME MAG. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://time.com/3256732/jennifer-lawrenceselfies-copyright/ (“Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, Kirsten Dunst . . . could . . .
file a [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] takedown notice while they fill out the
paperwork for a formal copyright on their photos, assuming they took the
images of themselves. If their takedown notices are ignored, they can then sue
the sites in question for copyright violation.”).
188
Id.
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VI.

THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL INTERNET OBSCURITY CENTER
Search engines have responded to the lack of obscurity rights
by creating their own policies for delisting or erasure. Google
states in its policies that in addition to removing content that
violates copyright, it also delists depictions of child sexual
abuse. 189 Google also states that it may remove the following
information:
• National identification numbers like United States Social Security
Number, Argentine Single Tax Identification Number, Brazil Cadastro
de pessoas Físicas, Korea Resident Registration Number, China
Resident Identity Card, etc.[;]
• Bank account numbers[;]
• Credit card numbers[;]
• Images of signatures[;]
• Nude or sexually explicit images that were uploaded or shared
without your consent[.]190

Google states that it uses the following criteria to determine
whether it will delist the link to the information:
To decide if a piece of personal information creates significant risks of
identity theft, financial fraud, or other specific harms, we ask:
• Is it a government-issued identification number?
• Is it confidential, or is it publicly available information?
• Can it be used for common financial transactions?
• Can it be used to obtain more information about an individual that
would result in financial harm or identity theft?
• Is it a personally identifiable nude or sexually explicit photo or
video shared without consent?
We apply this policy on a case-by-case basis. If we believe that a
removal request is being used to try and remove other, non-personal
information from search results, we will deny the request. Note: We
usually don’t remove information that can be found on official
government websites because the information is publicly available.191

It appears from these policies that Google understands that it
must provide some level of obscurity for individuals because of the
tremendous impact its services make on the lives of those people
whose data is revealed. However, the mechanism by which Google
189

See Removal Policies, GOOGLE.COM, https://support.google.com/
websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
190
Id.
191
Id.
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makes these decisions is not transparent to those individuals or
regulators.
The CJEU opinion 192 creates substantial implementation
problems for search engines and data brokers that must determine
when links to information should be removed. Companies in these
businesses may err on the side of caution to avoid regulatory
action, and comply with requests to remove links to content in
more situations than just search results from the query of an
individual’s name. By doing so, these compliance efforts may limit
the free flow of information more than necessary to protect
individual privacy. It seems unfair, and in fact inappropriate to
charge private companies like Google with developing and
applying criteria to determine under what circumstances to protect
an individual’s right to obscurity. This type of a determination is
usually reserved for a body elected by and accountable to citizens.
However, the complex global need for a right to obscurity creates
issues related to the jurisdiction, powers and procedures of a
government body that would make these determinations.
One way to deal with the complexity of implementing the
CJEU’s guidance would be to establish a centralized body to
handle “obscurity requests” from individuals. This could be called
an “Internet Obscurity Center,” overseen by regulators who would
opt through their country’s legislation to work with the Center.
This system would allow individuals to first go to the Center with a
complaint, and only resort to filing a complaint with the regulator
if they are not satisfied with the result provided by the Center.
Regulators could provide search engines and data brokers with
protection from liability when following the direction of such a
centralized obscurity center. The obscurity center could function as
a co-regulatory body with companies voluntarily participating.
Companies would agree to eventual oversight of the regulatory
agencies, and would agree to comply with delisting
recommendations made by the Center. The Center would create a
more efficient system, which removes the burden of making these
192

See Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and
Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario
Costeja González, 2013 E.C.R. 424 (June 25, 2013).
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determinations from each individual company and provides
individuals with reasonable access to a remedy. This model would
also provide an international solution and an effective forum for a
transparent international dialogue on the criteria for delisting.
The obscurity center would need to make difficult judgments
about when information should be obscured. However, as the
authors have previously written,193 in addition to the test articulated
in the ECHR case law, other criteria can be used to determine if
information should warrant obscurity. The authors suggest that the
following six criteria the Center could use to evaluate obscurity
requests:
Criterion
Lapse of time

Illegally
obtained data

Description
A person did a bad
thing but truly feels
sorry, paid debt, and
learned the lesson
The original collection
or use of the data
violated a law

Discrimination The likelihood an
individual will be
discriminated against
on the basis of the
information
Sensitive Data Information that the
individual just doesn’t
want people knowing

193

Example
A drunk driving
conviction followed by
20 years of sobriety and
exemplary driving
Trespass, identity theft,
service provider employee
theft, blackmail, revenge
porn, stalking
Data based on race,
ethnicity, sexual
orientation
Bank account information,
social security number,
health data

David Hoffman, Europe’s New Right to be Forgotten: Not New and Not
Forgetting, POLICY @ INTEL BLOG (July 16, 2014), https://blogs.intel.com/
policy/2014/07/16/europes-new-right-forgotten-new-forgetting/.
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Taken Out of
Context

Information that is
misleading or creates
a negative impression
when taken out of its
original context

Individual as
Victim

Information about
certain crime victims
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Placing some punk rock
lyrics in a blog about the
use of profanity in music,
and later the lyrics are
quoted as the thinking of
the individual
Domestic violence
victims

These categories and the ECHR test would need to be refined
before search engines and data brokers put them into practice
globally. Which organizations would be required to abide by the
obscurity center’s decisions would need to be clearly articulated.
However, given the concentration of internet searching and data
broker activity in a few powerful players, simply applying the
process to the leading companies would provide individuals with
access to considerable practical obscurity.
The obscurity center could establish a board of advisors
comprising globally recognized privacy and free expression
experts to help refine the decision-making criteria. The criteria
could and should be created in an open and transparent process
with full opportunity for comment by civil society, government
and industry. If companies or individuals are not satisfied with any
individual decision made by the obscurity center, they could appeal
the decision to their country’s regulator or court system. Such a
system would take the burden off of the search engines and data
brokers and appropriately place it on regulators and the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the provisions of the Directive, the CJEU was
neither insane, nor nearsighted when it decided Google Spain. It is
fair, however, to fault the CJEU for providing only minimal
guidance on how to implement such an important ruling on a topic
critical to fundamental human rights. The CJEU’s opinion has
furthered a discussion that requires more analysis and creative
thinking about how to promote the trust of individuals in the use of
the digital infrastructure. Finding methods to implement the
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CJEU’s opinion will be difficult, and must guard against unduly
limiting free expression.
This implementation needs to comprehend where technology is
headed, given advances in data analytics, cloud computing and the
Internet of things. Traditional spaces of increased privacy
protection, like the home, will need these obscurity rights to
continue to be a place of refuge for individuals. At the same time,
the decision should be implemented in a way that will promote free
expression, providing assurances that individuals can take risks,
voice unpopular opinions, engage in political dissent, and question
the status quo without fear that a record of their speech will be
globally available in perpetuity. Continued discussion of “the right
to obscurity” is necessary. That exploration is critically important
at a time where efforts are underway to put in place new privacy
laws around the world.
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